How Did the Qing Train Itself Out of Existence? — The 1911 Revolution: Causes and Founders

《神州大地》第 12 集 · 語言：English · 時長：37:28

出處：sylogs.com — 歡迎轉載分享，請注明出處

The first of January, 1912.

Nanjing. At night, a new name for

the country was read aloud.

The Republic of China.

A provisional president was sworn in.

This was Asia's first republic — before it,

no country in Asia had tried a

system without an emperor.

But that day was a beginning,

not an ending. Because there was still

a court in Beijing.

The emperor was still in the Forbidden

City, the reign title was still in

use, and the Beiyang army was still

in someone's hands. So the question is:

how did a dynasty come to nothing?

Was it beaten down by somebody?

The answer this episode argues is a

surprising one: it was not beaten down.

It reformed itself — new policies, a new

army, centralising power, collecting taxes — and step

by step, it dismantled its own foundations.

To talk about 1911, we have to

start earlier. Start with the mess.

There was a saying in late-Qing officialdom:
three years as an honest prefect,
and a hundred thousand taels of silver.
What it described was not one corrupt
man. It was an entire way of
operating: official salaries were low, and what
actually kept people alive were the extra
fees and customary levies.
Those above were supported by those below,
and those below scraped it off the
people. Layer after layer, everyone lived this
way. This is not a question of
anyone's morality. It is a structure:
when the salary cannot support life,
money has to come from somewhere other
than the salary.
If that was true of the civil
service, the military side could not be
counted on either. The Qing's standing forces
were the Eight Banners and the Green
Standard Army. They could fight when the
dynasty was founded; by the late Qing
they were something else entirely.
There were men on the rolls and
none in the barracks — officers drawing pay
for empty ranks was an open secret.

After long years of peace, the blades
had rusted. An army had forgotten how
to fight. What remained was one use
only: to exist on paper.
In 1894, the First Sino-Japanese War.
The Beiyang Fleet, thirty years of self-strengthening
poured into it, was destroyed outright.
Defeated by Japan — the shock of that
at the time is hard to imagine
now. Not defeated by a Western power,
but by a neighbour that had been
forced open in the same way,
decades earlier. The next year, the Treaty
of Shimonoseki: an indemnity of two hundred
million taels, ports opened, and Taiwan ceded.
Thirty years of buying ships, building factories
and drilling troops — one war, back to
the starting point. The real consequence was
not the size of the indemnity.
It was that a great many people
arrived at the same sentence at the
same time: buying ships without changing the
system may simply not be enough.
Some tried to change it from inside.
Not by rebellion — from the top.
In 1898, the Guangxu emperor issued edicts for
a new policy: abolish the eight-legged essay,

open schools, train a new army,
cut redundant posts. One hundred and three
days. What it touched was not just
regulations. It was the positions of a
great many people — conservative grandees were dismissed,
transferred, threatened. Then Cixi staged a coup,
and every reform was rescinded.
Tan Sitong and five others were executed
at Caishikou in Beijing.
Tan left words behind, and he left
a choice behind as well: he could
have left. The first attempt at saving
itself was cut short like that.
A greater humiliation was still to come.
In 1900, the Boxers entered Beijing and the
Eight-Nation Alliance came. Cixi took the emperor
with her and fled to Xi'an.
In 1901, the Boxer Protocol was signed.
An indemnity of four hundred and fifty
million taels — the figure was set that
way, one tael for every person in
the country. With interest, roughly nine hundred
and eighty million taels, payable over thirty-nine
years. The figures come from the text
of the protocol itself, and became the
heaviest fixed charge on late-Qing finances.
From then on, the court was called

the court of the foreigners.
Where would the money come from?
Not from the treasury — the treasury was
empty. It was apportioned down to every
village: provinces took their share, then added
their own charges, and it landed on
land, on salt, on goods.
The second attempt came earlier.
It was called self-strengthening.
The self-strengtheners' proposal, in eight words:
Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning
for use. Buy machines, build factories,
make guns and cannon, open mines,
found a language college, send students abroad.
What was learned was technique.
The system was not to be touched.
The war of 1894 proved that learning
only the surface is not enough.
Technique cannot save a rotted system.
That sentence was not added afterwards by
historians — a great many people at the
time worked it out themselves.
After 1900, the court had been hurt badly
enough to really act.
From 1901, the New Policies began: train a
new army, encourage industry, restructure the administration,
establish a ministry of education, send commissioners

abroad to observe. In 1905, a thousand years
of the examination system was abolished
it is hard to overstate this:
the road by which a literate man
moved upward had been changed.
New schools were founded, students sent abroad;
a new-model army was trained on Western
lines, with Western drill and Western rifles.
All three were done.
One thing was not: the political system
was left untouched. The surface was changed.
The root was still the old one.
Later on, even a constitution was put
on the table. The trigger was somebody
else's war: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904,
which Japan won. A small constitutional country
defeating a large autocracy was a comparison
quoted endlessly at home.
There was a wave of demand inside
the country: Yuan Shikai, Zhang Zhidong and
other senior officials petitioned jointly for a
constitution, and the press pressed as well.
In 1906, the court announced preparatory constitutionalism.
In 1908, the Outline of an Imperial Constitution
was promulgated: imperial power sacred and inviolable,
with a preparatory period of nine years.
In 1909, provincial consultative assemblies were set up

the delegates were elected, many of them
gentry and merchants, constitutionalists, and for the
first time they had a place to
speak. Nine years was asked for.
Others could not wait nine years.
Once the assemblies opened, people learned two
things: how to put forward a motion,
and how to act together.
A list laid the whole question of
sincerity open. On 8 May 1911, the Qing's first
cabinet was formed. Thirteen men.
Nine were Manchu and only four were
Han; of the nine Manchus, seven were
from the imperial clan.
The list appears in the cabinet regulations
and the edicts of appointment, and the
clan branches can be verified.
The army, the navy and the treasury
military power and financial power — were all
in the hands of imperial kinsmen.
Contemporaries called it the imperial-clan cabinet.
This broke the ordinary rule of constitutional
monarchy: in such a system, members of
the royal house do not sit in
the cabinet. The constitutionalists were stunned.
Zhang Jian, Tang Hualong, Tan Yankai and
others petitioned jointly, saying an imperial-clan cabinet

was incompatible with constitutional monarchy.
The court ignored them. Trying to pull power
in, they pushed their allies away.
The last straw came the next day.
On 9 May 1911, an edict: the main railway
trunk lines were to be nationalised.
The Sichuan-Hankou and Guangzhou-Hankou lines were taken
into state ownership. The problem was not
the word nationalisation. It was how it
was done. The Sichuan share capital was
around fourteen million taels — the figure appears
in People's Daily and in the Institute
of Modern History of the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences — and much of it
came from a rent levy: collected with
the land tax at three percent,
so that farmers across Sichuan held a
share. The government would exchange it for
state bonds, not cash.
And three million taels of the shortfall
which included some two and a half
million taels lost when Shanghai money shops
collapsed in the rubber crash — was not
recognised. In the same month, the minister
of posts and communications, Sheng Xuanhuai,
borrowed six million pounds from a four-power
banking consortium of Britain, America, Germany and

France, secured on Hunan and Hubei transit dues and the salt tax.

In June, the Sichuan Railway Protection League was founded, with hundreds of thousands of members. On 7 September, the Chengdu massacre: the Sichuan governor-general Zhao Erfeng ordered troops to fire, and more than thirty petitioners died. On 25 September, Rongxian declared independence half a month before Wuchang.

By this point, the merchants' money and the farmers' rent shares had been taken too.

At this point one thing can be made clear: why did the New Policies and the new army end up dismantling the dynasty itself? First: the new army was organised on new lines — literate, structured, armed, and able to read the new newspapers. The court gave them organisation and weapons, but not a sense of belonging.

The first shot at Wuchang was fired by the engineering battalion of the Hubei new army. An army with guns and organisation became the group best placed to overthrow the court. Second: the constitutionalists were the ones who most wanted the dynasty preserved. Once the imperial-clan cabinet appeared,

the literati turned to revolution — assembly delegates,
school-founding gentry, railway investors, all turning around
together. Liang Qichao had a line that
has been quoted ever since: the present
government is a great factory for manufacturing
revolutionaries. It wanted to strengthen itself.
Instead it armed its opponents.
So now: who set it in motion.
The first person to speak of is
Sun Yat-sen. In 1894, he founded the Revive
China Society in Honolulu — he was twenty-eight,
and a letter he had sent to
Li Hongzhang had gone unanswered.
In 1905 in Tokyo, the Revive China Society
merged with the China Revival Society and
the Restoration Society to form the Revolutionary
Alliance, and he was elected its director,
advocating the Three Principles of the People:
nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood.
Whichever side writes this history, both honour
him as the forerunner of the revolution.
But to be precise: he was not
the first to call for the overthrow
of the Qing, and he was not
the only one. He was the one
who lasted. Others scattered after one failure;
he failed more than ten times and

kept going.

In the six years after the Alliance
was founded, it launched a dozen or
more uprisings. Guangzhou, Huizhou, Chaozhou, Huanggang,
Qinvhu, Fangcheng, Zhennanguan, Qinlian, Hekou — the names
Guangzhou and Huizhou recur again and again
in Qing memorials. Failure after failure.

Some risings scattered within days; some were
broken up before they could assemble.

Where did the money come from?

It came from overseas Chinese — miners and
shopkeepers in Southeast Asia, restaurant owners and
laundrymen in America, subscribing, holding charity sales,
sometimes selling their property.

That is also why he could rise
again after every defeat.

In this circle, failure was the norm
and scattering was the reasonable response.

He simply did not stop.

That he did not stop was itself
his greatest asset.

But the revolutionary camp was not a
single block either. In 1914, after the failure
of the Second Revolution, Sun Yat-sen formed
a new party in Tokyo — the Chinese
Revolutionary Party — setting aside the Nationalist Party.

Its rules required new members to swear

an oath to follow Mr.
Sun, with wording such as "if my
heart should waver, may I suffer the
utmost penalty"; and they had to give
a fingerprint. The party's second figure,
Huang Xing, opposed this — Huang was the
founder of the China Revival Society and
the commander at Huanghuagang and at the
battle of Hankou and Hanyang.
He refused to join, and his reasons
are in his letters to Sun and
to comrades: swearing a fingerprint oath of
personal loyalty was a reversal for a
democratic revolution, and an insult to his
comrades. Sun did not yield.
On 30 June 1914, Huang Xing left for America.
The two went their separate ways.
Scholars of early Republican politics, Yang Tianshi
among them, generally regard this as a
low point in Sun's career — because by
the time of the National Protection War,
the anti-Yuan force that actually took the
stage was not his party but the
circle around Liang Qichao and Cai E.
A man who advocated republicanism also walked
the road of centralising power.
That is one of the most telling

internal wounds of 1911.

Money was never a settled question among the revolutionaries. In 1907, when Sun left Japan, Japanese friends and merchants gave him gifts amounting to more than twenty thousand yen. He left only two thousand for the newspaper Minbao and took the rest for actual risings in Chaozhou and Huizhou.

This exploded in Tokyo.

Zhang Taiyan — and Zhang Ji and Liu Shipei with him — launched a movement against Sun, putting up notices accusing him of having secretly taken Japanese money and of misusing public funds. What the later inquiry found is recorded in the Alliance's internal investigation and in Sun's own statement of accounts: his mother and his brother were not living comfortably, which did not look like someone who had embezzled a fortune; he produced a list of receipts and payments, saying he had spent nothing public beyond board, lodging and travel.

His brother Sun Mei had given away his whole property for the revolution and gone bankrupt. In the end, no evidence was produced for the embezzlement charge, and the talk died down.

What this episode really shows is something
else: even comrades questioned one another.
For an organisation living on donations,
financial transparency was a problem from the
very beginning.
Having said all that, one more thing
should be said: he was an ordinary
man too. His marriages and relationships have
been recorded repeatedly, both then and since:
his first wife Lu Muzhen, from an
arranged marriage in his home village;
a marriage to Otsuki Kaoru during his
years in Japan, and a daughter from
it; and his marriage to Soong Ching-ling
in 1915. He was forty-nine that year and
she was twenty-two. The difference in age,
and the setting aside of his first
wife, were discussed at the time
the Soong family objected at first,
and some comrades thought it unfair to
Lu Muzhen. On the other hand,
his speaking ability and personal magnetism really
were his greatest capital in raising money
and mobilising support; that too is consistent
in the accounts of his contemporaries.
Also from his contemporaries: the description of
him as not constant in his affections.

Beyond his achievements and his failures,
he had a private life as well.
None of this changes who he was
but put together, it is what makes
a person.
Besides overthrowing the Qing, he had a
design: what to do afterwards.
Two concepts were his own.
One is the five-power constitution: adding examination
and control to the executive, legislative and
judicial powers. The second is the separation
of powers and functions.
Power is split in two: the people
hold four powers — election, recall, initiative and
referendum — called political power; the government holds
five, called governing power.
Together it means the people have authority
and the government has capacity.
The idea appears in outline in a
1906 speech and is set out systematically
in the 1924 lectures on democracy.
Did it leave institutional traces?
Yes: the 1947 constitution adopted a five-yuan
structure. The design survived.
Assessments differ — some value it as a
Chinese-designed constitutional scheme, others criticise the fivefold
division as unclear in practice.

This film states it and leaves the
judgement to the viewer.
One more thing is worth noticing:
his party kept changing.
From the Revive China Society to the
Revolutionary Alliance, a small body became a
united front. In 1912, with the Republic founded,
the Alliance became the Nationalist Party,
taking the path of parliamentary competition,
and this time it was Song Jiaoren
who led it. In 1914, after the failure
of the Second Revolution, Sun formed the
Chinese Revolutionary Party and drew power back
to the party leader personally.
In 1919, it was renamed the Kuomintang.
In 1924, it was reorganised in Guangzhou:
Soviet advisers brought in, communists allowed to
join as individuals, and a party machine
built on the principle of governing through
the party. The line of swing is
clear: from a parliamentary party to a
centralised party. The parliamentary path Song Jiaoren
advocated in 1912 was overridden twice, in 1914 and
in 1924. This film states the sequence and
does not say which one ought to
have won.
Even the title of head of state

was disputed. In 1921, the Guangzhou military government
elected him "extraordinary president".
The word extraordinary describes the post itself:
an expedient created for the emergency of
the constitution-protection period. And because it was
an expedient for an emergency, its term
and its legality were questioned.
Among those who questioned it was Chen
Jiongming — inside the same revolutionary camp,
objecting precisely to whether "extraordinary" could be
used that way. His principle of governing
through the party was also read by
contemporaries as placing a leader's power above
the ordinary track of constitutional government.
These were the arguments of people at
the time — not criticism added later,
but things said in the newspapers and
correspondence of the day.
This film sets them beside the assessment
of him as the forerunner of the
revolution, without verdict, and without any reference
to any present-day system.
Having dealt with Sun Yat-sen, there is
a second question to answer.
Why did the people who most wanted
to preserve the Qing end up leaving
too? They were the constitutionalists: Zhang Jian,

Tang Hualong, Tan Yankai, Tang Shouqian,
Liang Qichao. What they wanted was not
revolution; they wanted a parliament.
They invested in railways, ran schools and
newspapers, sat in the provincial assemblies
no one wanted the country to fall
into chaos more than they did.
They gave the court nine years.
Once the imperial-clan cabinet appeared, the hope
collapsed entirely: thirteen men, nine Manchu,
seven of the imperial clan, military and
financial power all in the hands of
kinsmen. The next day, the railways were
nationalised. The money they had put in
was taken as well.
So the constitutionalists turned.
When the shots were fired at Wuchang
in October, many of the first to
respond were the chairmen and members of
the provincial assemblies. Liang Qichao's line,
compressed to a few words: the government,
a factory for manufacturing revolutionaries.
The ones who wanted to preserve it
left in the end.
That is one man.
There was a whole group.
The first is Huang Xing.

In 1904 he founded the China Revival Society
in Changsha. At Huanghuagang he led the
attack on the governor-general's yamen with two
fingers of his right hand shot away,
and kept directing to the end.
In the battle of Hankou and Hanyang
after the Wuchang rising — forty-odd days
he was the front-line commander in chief;
those forty days bought time for the
southern provinces. In the accounts of his
contemporaries he is described as loyal,
brave, and uninterested in power: he was
named with Sun as Sun-Huang, but never
contested position with him; and when the
two parted in 1914 he chose to step
aside rather than fight.
In one sentence: he was Sun's other
half.
There was one man who believed in
parliament to the end.
Song Jiaoren. After the Wuchang rising he
took part in organising the provisional government
in Nanjing; when the Alliance was reorganised
into the Nationalist Party, he was the
one who actually ran it, turning it
into a party that would compete for
votes. He argued for a party cabinet:

the majority party in parliament forms the
government, and responsibility lies with the cabinet
rather than with a president personally.
In the 1913 National Assembly elections the
Nationalist Party won a majority of seats
the first nationwide parliamentary election in China.
What followed is beyond this episode's scope.
His ideal did not get through.
But that path was tried once,
and the fact that it was tried
is worth remembering.
Besides guns, the pens came in too.
Zhang Taiyan. In 1903 he wrote Refuting Kang
Youwei's Views on Revolution, naming Kang directly
and rejecting his monarchist argument; in the
same year the Subao case broke and
he was imprisoned for three years.
After his release he went to Japan
and edited Minbao, and for several years
fought a war of articles with Liang
Qichao's New People's Miscellany over whether there
should be a revolution at all
the largest public debate of the late
Qing. He wrote against the monarchists.
He also wrote against comrades: he was
one of those who launched the 1907
movement against Sun. One article, copied and

recopied as it was then, was worth
a detachment of troops.
A younger generation wrote with their lives.
Zou Rong's The Revolutionary Army appeared in 1903;
its author was nineteen.
The book calls out "long live the
Chinese Republic", and it was printed as
a pamphlet and reprinted endlessly.
Two years later he died in prison,
aged twenty. In the same year,
Chen Tianhua's Alarm Bell and Sudden Awakening
were published. He wrote in the plainest
language: how the powers are carving the
country up, how China is being destroyed.
These two pamphlets circulated very widely in
the new army. In December 1905, after the
controversy over the Japanese regulations on Chinese
students, Chen Tianhua left a last letter
and drowned himself in the sea at
Omori, aged thirty. He used his death
to persuade: fearing that his compatriots would
not listen, or would forget, he threw
himself into the sea as a reminder
to you all. They did not live
to see it — they did not live
to see the day of the republic.
Among them there were women too.

Qiu Jin. She came from an official
family, married, had two children, then went
to study in Japan; she returned to
publish a women's journal, promote women's education,
and run the Datong School in Shaoxing.
In July 1907, implicated in Xu Xilin's Anqing
rising, she was arrested by Qing authorities.
On 15 July she was executed at Xuantingkou
in Shaoxing, aged thirty-one.
The most widely repeated line is what
she wrote before her execution: "autumn wind,
autumn rain, fill one with melancholy"
the phrase appears in Qing case records
and in many later accounts, though scholars
still discuss its original source.
She did not live to 1911.
But she was one link in this
chain.
One more thing needs saying: the revolutionaries
were not one society, they were many.
The main ones: the Revive China Society,
founded in Honolulu in 1894; the China Revival
Society in Changsha and the Restoration Society
in Shanghai, both in 1904; in Hubei,
the Reading Society and the Science Study
Institute, each with its own members and
its own ground. In August 1905 in Tokyo

these bodies combined into the Chinese Revolutionary
Alliance, with Sun Yat-sen as director and
Huang Xing as general manager.
This was a real merger: scattered forces
at last had a centre.
But it must also be said:
numbers alone do not win.
For six years after the merger,
the uprisings still numbered a dozen-odd,
and still every one failed.
The real difference was that someone led
someone who kept raising money, kept reorganising,
and kept going on to the next
attempt.
To close the line of uprisings, the failures
come first. From the large rising of
miners and sworn brotherhoods at Pingxiang,
Liuyang and Liling in 1906, to the rising
of the Guangzhou new army in 1910,
to the last one — the Guangzhou rising
of 27 April 1911. From Ping-Liu-Li to Huanghuagang,
every one had the same ending.
At Guangzhou, Huang Xing led some hundred
men into the governor-general's yamen; the governor-general
fled, the attackers were surrounded by naval
forces, and by nightfall it was over.
Afterwards Pan Dawei collected seventy-two bodies and

buried them at Red Flower Ridge,
renamed Huanghuagang — hence the customary seventy-two martyrs.
Fourteen more names were later established and
inscribed on the reverse of the memorial
arch, giving eighty-six names that can be
verified. Among the dead was Lin Juemin,
twenty-four, a student in Japan, wounded at
the yamen and taken alive.
The night before the rising he wrote
two letters, one to his father and
one to his wife Chen Yiying.
That one letter — " I enlarge the love
I have for you, to help all
people love those they love" — still brings
tears a hundred years later.
And then that night.
10 October 1911. Wuchang. What happened that night is,
told plainly, very short: soldiers of the
eighth engineering battalion of the Hubei new
army moved first, because word of a
register of names had leaked in the
barracks. Who fired the first shot is
recorded differently in different sources — the common
account is a soldier of the eighth
engineering battalion, but accounts differ as to
the individual. What can be said is
that the shooting was done by soldiers,

not by generals. The governor-general of Huguang,
Ruicheng, escaped through a hole in the
back wall of his yamen and boarded
a gunboat on the river.
Overnight, Wuchang changed hands.
By the following morning the flag over
the city had changed.
No senior commander was present to direct
it. It was common soldiers who started
it.
Within that night there was a contrast
between two men, more neatly turned than
any script. The first: Sun Yat-sen in
America. When the Wuchang rising happened,
he was in the United States raising
money for uprisings. In mid-October he read
the news from Wuchang in a newspaper
not by telegram, but in the paper.
He wrote about this himself later.
Which is to say: he was not
there. The rising that toppled the Qing
was launched without its originator present.
The second: Li Yuanhong.
He was the commander of the twenty-first
mixed brigade of the Hubei new army,
and he was not with his unit
on the night of the rising.

The next day he was found by
soldiers and made military governor of the
Hubei military government. The most widespread story
is that he was found at home,
or under a bed, and refused at
first; the details differ across memoirs and
the original source cannot be verified
what is certain is that he was
unwilling at first and agreed later.
And there is something better: a few
days earlier the soldiers had privately called
him " Bodhisattva Li", because he treated men
leniently and did not punish them lightly.
The men who had called him a
bodhisattva days before were, days later,
pressing the seal into the same man's
hands. The jokes history tells are neater
than any script.
After Wuchang, the provinces responded like dominoes.
In the two months after Wuchang:
on 22 October, Changsha and Xi'an; on 29 October,
Taiyuan; on 30 October, Kunming; on 31 October,
Nanchang;on 3 November, Shanghai; on the 5th,
Jiangsu; on the 7th, Anhui; on the
8th, Fuzhou; on the 9th, Guangdong;
on the 13th, Shandong; on the 22nd,
Chongqing; on the 27th, Chengdu.

Within two months, fifteen provinces had declared
themselves separated from the Qing.
Some of it with blood — there was
street fighting in Taiyuan and Xi'an;
some of it almost without — Cheng Dequan,
the governor of Jiangsu, was made military
governor after knocking a few tiles off
the roof of his yamen with a
bamboo pole, and that counted as revolution.
The Qing's map came apart piece by
piece.
Back to the first day.
1 January 1912. Nanjing. Sun Yat-sen was sworn in
as provisional president of the Republic of
China, took the oath, changed the calendar,
and fixed the name of the state:
the Republic of China.
This was Asia's first republic without an
emperor — before it, no country in Asia
had tried such a system.
Two thousand years of imperial rule turned
a corner on that day.
Turned a corner, not finished: the emperor
in the north was still on the
throne and the reign title still in
use. The abdication came forty-one days later.
This history is not only in books.

You can still go and see.
In Guangzhou, the tomb of the seventy-two
martyrs at Huanghuagang, in Huanghuagang Park — open,
and you can pay respects; the memorial
arch there carries the eighty-six names established
later. In Wuhan, the Red House in
Wuchang — the former Hubei military government,
today the Xinhai Revolution Memorial Hall of
Wuchang — open to visitors, with the meeting
hall of those days still there.
In Nanjing, the Presidential Palace, today the
Museum of Modern Chinese History — open;
Sun's office from those years is preserved
in the grounds. Outside Nanjing, on Zijin
Mountain, the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum — open,
and where he was finally laid to
rest. The tombs are still there.
The people have been gone a hundred
years.
But it was not over.
On 1 January 1912, the Qing court in the north
was still there: the emperor still in
the Forbidden City, and Yuan Shikai still
holding the six Beiyang divisions — the most
completely trained force in the country.
The south had a republic; the north
had an army. The new government had

a name; the old court had troops.

So who would finish it?

Fight it out, or talk it out?

Who would take the last step?

And how was the emperor's abdication edict

written? In the next episode, we take

up Yuan Shikai — his return to power,

the north-south negotiations, the pressure on the

court, and the abdication edict of 12 February 1912.

The full script and sources for this

film are at sylogs.com.

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